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The Federal Income Tax Treatment of
Alimony Payments-The "Support"
Requirement of the Regulations
By John W. Harris*
THE federal income tax treatment of payments made by a divorced
husband to his ex-wife is governed principally by sections 71 and 215
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.1 These sections interrelate in
that payments taxable to the recipient under section 71 are deductible
by the payor under section 215. To be taxable and deductible under
these sections, payments must meet three basic requirements. First,
* B.A., 1965, Duke University; J.D., 1968, Harvard Law School; Member,
Texas Bar, ABA.
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71, provides in part: "(a) GENERAL RULE.-
(1) DECREE OF DIVORCE OR SEPARATE MAINTENANCE If a wife is divorced or
legally separated from her husband under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance,
the wife's gross income includes periodic payments (whether or not made at regular
intervals) received after such decree in discharge of (or attributable to property
transferred, in trust or otherwise, in discharge of) a legal obligation which, because of
the marital or family relationship, is imposed on or incurred by the husband under
the decree or under a written instrument incident to such divorce or separation.
"(2) WRTrEN SEPARATION AGREEMENT.-If a wife is separated from her husband
and there is a written separation agreement executed after the date of the enactment
of this title, the wife's gross income includes periodic payments (whether or not made
at regular intervals) received after such agreement is executed which are made under
such agreement and because of the marital or family relationship (or which are
attributable to property transferred, in trust or otherwise, under such agreement and
because of such relationship). This paragraph shall not apply if the husband and wife
make a single return jointly.
"(3) DECREE FOR sUPPORT.-If a wife is separated from her husband, the wife's
gross income includes periodic payments (whether or not made at regular intervals)
received by her after the date of the enactment of this title from her husband under
a decree entered after March 1, 1954, requiring the husband to make the payments for
her support or maintenance. This paragraph shall not apply if the husband and wife
make a single return jointly."
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 215, provides in part: "(a) General Rule.-In the
case of a husband described in section 71, there shall be allowed as a deduction amounts
includible under section 71 in the gross income of his wife, payment of which is made
within the husband's taxable year."
Similar provisions first appeared in the Internal Revenue Code in 1942. Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 22(k), 56 Stat. 816 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 71); Int.
Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23(u), 56 Stat. 817 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 215).
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the payments must be made under decree or written agreement.2 Sec-
ond, the payments must be "periodic." 3  Third, the payments must be
made "because of the family or marital relationship in recognition of
the general obligations to support."' 4 It is the purpose of this article to
explore the history, rationale, judicial construction, and future of this
"support" requirement.
The case law indicates substantial overlap among the three above
requirements. For example, a factor which determines whether the
disputed payments meet the "periodic" requirement may also be very
important in determining whether they meet the "support" requirement.
Because of this overlap, it is important to understand the basic ele-
ments of each of the three requirements.
I. The Requirements of Section 71
A. The Decree or Written Agreement
To qualify for treatment under sections 71 and 215 the payments
must first be made under the necessary decree, instrument, or agree-
ment.' Payments made under the following kinds of decrees, instru-
ments, or agreements meet this first requirement:
(1) Payments made under a decree of divorce or separate main-
tenance, or under a written instrument incident to such de-
cree.
6
(2) Payments made under a written separation agreement where
the couple's separation has not been formalized by a court
decree.7
(3) Payments made under a decree requiring the husband to
make payments to the wife for her support or maintenance."
In all of the cases discussed in this article, one of the above alternatives
has been met, and the payments were concededly made under the neces-
sary decree, instrument, or agreement.
B. "Periodic" Payments
To qualify under section 71(a), the payments must also be "pe-
2. See text accompanying notes 5-8 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 9-12 infra.
4. Treas. Reg. § 1.71(b)(4) (1957) (emphasis added).
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71(a). See note 1 supra.
6. Id. § 71(a)(1).
7. Id. § 71(a) (2). This provision was originally enacted in the 1954 Code.
8. Id. § 71(a)(3). This provision was originally enacted in the 1954 Code.
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riodic"--although the Code itself does not attempt to define this term.
The most obviously "periodic" payments are those that have no time
limit and are regularly payable in specific amounts. The most obvi-
ously "nonperiodic" payment would be a lump sum, paid in either
cash or property.9
It may be argued that a principal sum paid in installments ought
to satisfy the "periodic" requirement. Internal Revenue Code section
71(c) (1), however, negates this argument, providing:
[I]nstallment payments discharging a part of an obligation the
principal sum of which is. . .specified in the decree, instrument,
or agreement shall not be treated as periodic payments.
The above general rule of section 71(c) (1), however, is sub-
ject to two well-recognized exceptions. First, section 71(c) (2), set-
ting forth what is hereinafter referred to as the "10-year rule," treats as
"periodic" any installment payments which will or may be made over
a period of more than 10 years from the effective date of the decree,
instrument, or agreement. It is further provided, however, that in any
one taxable year of the recipient wife, "periodic" treatment is limited
to 10 percent of the principal obligation.10
The second exception, hereinafter referred to as the "contingencies
rule," is provided by the regulations. Here, "periodic" characteriza-
tion is given to all payments that must terminate upon the occurrence
of any or all of the contingencies of death of either spouse, remarriage
of the wife, or change in the economic status of either-and this is
true whether such contingencies are spelled out in the decree, instru-
ment, or agreement or are imposed by local law." The presence of
any such contingencies makes "periodic" even those installment pay-
ments of a principal sum otherwise payable in 10 years or less. Fur-
ther, installment payments of a principal sum otherwise payable over
a period in excess of 10 years, qualifying under the "10-year rule" as
"periodic," will not be subject to the 10 percent annual limitation if
9. The lump-sum transfer of property pursuant to a divorce settlement will
have implications beyond the area of includability and deductibility. The Supreme
Court has held that the transfer of appreciated stock from the husband to the wife
as consideration for her release of certain marital rights such as "dower" is a "taxable
event" to the husband, requiring recognition of gain on the property transferred.
United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). The Davis doctrine does not appear to
be directly relevant to our inquiry, however, because (1) the transfer therein was con-
cededly not a "periodic" payment and (2) all of the "periodic" payments in the cases
which will be examined here were made in cash.
10. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 71(c)(2).
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3) (1957).
the payments also qualify under the "contingencies rule."' 2
With six notable exceptions,' 3 all cases discussed in this article
have facts which will qualify at least part of the disputed cash pay-
ments as "periodic."
C. The "Support" Requirement
The final requirement under section 71(a) is that the payments
must be made "because of the marital or family relationship."' 4  The
regulations further state that the "scope" of section 71 (a) is specifically
limited to payments made "because of the family or marital relationship
in recognition of the general obligation to support which is made spe-
cific by the decree, instrument, or agreement."15 This particular re-
quirement-that payments be for "support" rather than in considera-
tion for a "property settlement"-will be examined in greater detail
in this article.
Thus, the inquiry may be narrowed to the following question:
When is a given cash payment or series of payments-concededly "pe-
riodic"' 6 and concededly made under the necessary decree, instrument,
or agreement-made "because of the family or marital relationship in
recognition of the general obligation to support?"17
12. Id. § 1.71-1(d)(4) (1957).
13. Illinois Nat'l Bank v. United States, 273 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1959); William
M. Joslin, Sr., 52 T.C. 231 (1969); William D. Price, Jr., 49 T.C. 676 (1968); Jacob
Gasman, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 213 (1967); Robert P. Garvey, 25 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1135 (1966); Joseph Freeland, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1460 (1960).
In Joslin, Garvey, and Freeland the Tax Court first discussed the "support v.
property settlement" issue. In Joslin and Freeland the court then went on to conclude
that payments were not deductible in any event since they were not "periodic," and it
could have done the same under the facts in Garvey. It would seem that since the
line between periodic and nonperiodic payments is much more clear than the "support
v. property settlement" line, all of these cases should have been decided on failure of
periodicity and the "support v. property settlement" issue should never have been
reached.
14. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 71(a)(l)-(2). See note 1 supra. Although
section 71(a) (3), does not use the phrase "because of the marital or family relation-
ship," the phrase that it does use-"payments for her support and maintenance"-
probably has the same effect. See F. SANDER, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION A-11 (BUREAU
OF NAT'L AFFAIRS TAx MANAGEMENT Portfolio No. 95, 2d ed., 1967) [hereinafter
cited as SANDER]. For an example involving section 71 (a) (3) payments, see Rev. Rul.
70-61, 1970 INT. REV. BULL. No. 6, at 5.
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(4) (1957) (emphasis added). The term "support"
is conspicuous in only one other place in the regulations-namely, in the requirement
that payments be "in the nature of alimony or an allowance for support" if the "con-
tingency rule" is to make them "periodic." Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3)(i)(b) (1957).
See text accompanying notes 11 & 12 supra.
16. Except for the six cases cited at note 13 supra.
17. Courts have normally phrased the issue as merely whether the payments by
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II. History and Rationale of the "Support"
Requirement
Since the introduction in 1942 of section 71's predecessor,' s a
"support" requirement has been in the regulations. It is, however,
difficult to find much authority for this requirement in the Code.
Whether it is an interpretation of the Code's phrase "because of the
marital or family relationship," or whether it is simply a gloss on the
caption of section 71, "Alimony and separate maintenance payments,"
is unclear.'0
At least the origin of the "support" requirement is clear. It first
appeared in the committee reports of the Revenue Act of 1942.20 It
appears to have been a relatively uncontroversial matter, as no one who
appeared before the House Ways and Means Committee expressed any
concern over a "support" interpretation, 2 and the Senate Finance Com-
mittee adopted the House "support" requirement without comment.22
Furthermore, the requirement must not have appeared so trouble-
some to Congress in 1954 as to warrant any change or discussion:
There is no mention whatsoever of "support" in either the House or
the Senate report.2 3  Perhaps, however, this absence of discussion in
the reports indicates that the "support" requirement was never well
considered.
Returning to the suggestion above that the "support" requirement
the husband were incurred "because of the marital or family relationship" and have
omitted the reference to "support," even though the "support v. property settlement"
issue was actually decided. This probably does not indicate judicial ignorance of the
"support" proviso of the regulations, but it may indicate that it is unnatural to think
of "support" as the only type of obligation arising "because of the marital or family
relationship." This phrase, most commentators have argued, would seem to encompass
far more than merely a "support" obligation. E.g., SANDER, supra note 14, at A-11.
18. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 22(k), 56 Stat. 816 (now INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 71).
19. SANDER, supra note 14, at A-11.
20. "This section applies only where the legal obligation being discharged arises
out of the family or marital relationship in recognition of the general obligation to
support, which is made specific by the instrument or decree." H.R. REP. No. 2333,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1942).
21. Hearings on the Revenue Revision of 1942 Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 92, 624, 2157 (1942).
22. S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83-85 (1942).
23. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 10, A-20 (1954); S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11, 171 (1954). One case has noted Congress's reenact-
ment of the alimony provisions without substantial change and has taken it to indicate
approval of their operation and of the regulations thereunder. Marcella C. Salapatas,
28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1205, 1207 (1969).
in the regulations may have arisen from an intent to interpret the
statutory phrase "because of the marital or family relationship,"24 it
has frequently been observed that such a phrase would embrace pay-
ments relating to far more than merely the ex-wife's right to support.25
One writer, Edward J. Hawkins, Jr., has suggested that the claims of
a wife on divorce may be divided into four categories:
(1) her right to support,
(2) her inchoate marital rights in the husband's property (such
as the right to a share in his estate at death and the right to
dower),
(3) property interests already received by the wife by law be-
cause of the marital relationship (namely, the wife's half in-
terest in her husband's property under community property
laws), and
(4) her property claims existing wholly independent of the mar-
riage.2
8
Viewing the matter de novo, it would seem that payments relating to
any of the first three categories do indeed arise out of the "marital or
family relationship." It would follow that such payments should be
taxable to the wife and deductible by the husband so long as the pay-
ments are also "periodic"2 and made pursuant to a decree or written
agreement. 28  Only those payments relating to the fourth category
should be characterized as payments settling property rights of the
wife.29
But alas, the courts have not so limited the "property settlement"
characterization of payments which otherwise qualify for treatment un-
der sections 71 and 215. It appears well settled that any periodic pay-
ments to the wife found to be for her interest in community property
24. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
25. See note 17 supra.
26. Hawkins, Tax Planning in a Divorce or Separation: The Techniques That
Can Be Used, 1 TAXATION FOR ACCOUNTANTS 154, 155 (July-August 1966). Hawkins's
discussion at this point was in a somewhat different context, but the categories may
still be useful and comprehensive for our purposes. His concern was United States v.
Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962). See note 9 supra. He concludes that the "taxable event
doctrine would apply to the first two categories of rights, but would not apply to the
third or fourth categories. While Hawkins never specifically mentions the "support"
requirement of the regulations, he does make the unique suggestion that Davis may
have located the "support v. property settlement" line, as well as the "taxable event"
line, between (2) and (3). Perhaps so, but as we shall see, the courts have usually
put the line between (1) and (2). See text accompanying notes 30-33 infra.
27. See text accompanying notes 9-12 supra.
28. See text accompanying notes 5-8 supra.
29. That the fourth category is nontaxable to the wife is made clear by the regu-
lations which use as an example the repayment of a bona fide loan made by the wife
to the husband. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(4) (1957).
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will be held nontaxable to the wife and nondeductible by the husband
despite the argument that these community property rights have arisen
out of the marital relationship."0 Similarly, Hawkins3' and his inter-
pretation of United States v. Davis32 notwithstanding, annuity pay-
ments found to be in discharge of the wife's dower rights have been
accorded "property settlement" treatment despite the argument that,
like community property interests, dower rights arise out of the marital
relationship.33 Thus, whatever arguments may have existed originally
as to the extent of rights arising "because of the marital or family rela-
tionship," it appears that the cases have drawn the "support v. property
settlement" line exactly where the regulations placed it-after Hawkins's
first category-and they have done so with almost no discussion or
criticism of where the line should be drawn.
As another rationale of the "support" proviso in the regulations,
it has been suggested by Professor Frank E. A. Sander that property
settlements are usually divisions of capital rather than allocations of
current income;34 hence, they seldom fit within the purpose underlying
section 7135 which apparently was to afford some tax relief to a hus-
band making regular payments from his after-tax income.3 6 But as
the same author points out, "Where property rights of the parties are
discharged in the form of a series of payments extending over a long
number of years, rather than through capital transfers, the payments
may in fact come out of income. '37 Furthermore, the cases have
made it clear that to be taxable to the wife it matters not whether the
source of the payments is "income" or "capital.13 8
Perhaps another line of analysis can be suggested. Viewing the
matter strictly from the wife's side, let us suppose that instead of the
marriage being dissolved by divorce, the husband dies. In a common
law state the widow would be entitled at least to her dower interest
30. See, e.g., Campbell v. Lake, 220 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1955); Harry Halprin,
28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1353 (1969).
31. See note 26 supra.
32. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
33. Bernatschke v. United States, 364 F.2d 400 (Ct. Cl. 1966). But see
Illinois Natl Bank v. United States, 273 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1959).
34. SANDER, supra note 14, at A-12.
35. Id.
36. See id. at A-1. See notes 40-41 & accompanying text infra.
37. SANDER, supra note 14, at A-12. This "capital v. income" distinction has
also been mentioned in Soltermann v. United States, 272 F.2d 387, 390 (9th Cir.
1959) and in Lounsbury v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1963).
38. E.g., Taylor v. Campbell, 335 F.2d 841, 844 (5th Cir. 1964); Hazel Porter,
25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 448, 450 (1966).
in the husband's property, and in a community property state she
would be entitled to her share of the community property. In all
states she would be entitled as well to cash or property in payment
of any bona fide debts owed her by her deceased husband. Although
all of these receipts would come to her without the imposition of any
federal income tax, in the usual case she would no longer have a claim
against her husband's estate for "support."3  Analogizing the situation
of the widow to that of the divorcee, should not only "support" payments
be taxed? Perhaps so, but the committee reports make it clear that
the 1942 amendment was not concerned with the wife's situation.4"
Rather, as mentioned above, it was enacted to relieve the plight of the
husband who was periodically forced to pay to a "stranger" a large
percentage of his after-tax income. 41 There was no intention to equate
his and his ex-wife's tax treatment with that of a husband's estate and
widow.
If this concern for the periodic drain on the husband's after-tax
income was the basic rationale for the 1942 amendment, then perhaps
the incidence of tax on the wife should turn not on the "support" or
"property settlement" nature of the payments, but strictly on whether
they are to be made on a regular and recurring basis over a fairly long
period of time. In fact, at least one reform proposal has been advanced
along these general lines, and will be discussed later.42
In any event, it is clear that the "support" requirement has had
a mysterious birth, a poorly rationalized existence in the regulations,
and, as we shall see, a myriad of applications in the cases. Perhaps it
is not a good rule-but it has seldom been the target of tax reform
advocates.4" The approach has been to try to understand its applica-
tion and to live with it.
III. Judicial Construction
As previously stated, the "support" requirement has been applied
39. The wife's rights at the husband's death are not nearly this simple and uni-
form among the states, but for our purposes they may be viewed in this simple frame-
work. For a discussion of the various existing and proposed "Matrimonial Property
Regimes," see C. FOOT, R. LEvY, & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY
LAW 317-23 (1966).
40. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 71-74 (1942).
41. Id.
42. Report of the Committee on Domestic Relations Tax Problems, BULL. ABA
SECTION OF TAXATION, July 1966 (Annual Report), at 62 [hereinafter cited as Tax
Section Annual Report]. See text accompanying notes 185-96 infra.
43. See text accompanying notes 183-98 infra.
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in numerous contexts.44 Seldom has there been a direct factual prece-
dent for a given case. The result usually turns on a combination of
factors rather than on one principal ground; thus, it appears that the
most useful way to analyze the cases is to examine the various factors
which have been discussed in them.
A. The Settled Doctrines
Certain propositions have been decided so consistently that it
would be fair to call them "the settled doctrines." First, the courts
will not be bound by the "support" or "property settlement" labels the
parties may have attached to certain payments in their agreement,45 or
which were used by the divorce court in its decree.
46
The effect of state law is a bit more complex. As a starting point,
it may be expected that a court would look to state law to characterize
a given property interest-in other words, is certain property of the
marriage the separate property of the husband (or wife), jointly-owned
property, or community property? This much reliance on state law is
allowed,47 if for no other reason than the lack of federal guidelines.
44. E.g., Bernatschke v. United States, 364 F.2d 400 (Ct. Cl. 1966), where an-
nuity payments to the wife were held to be a property settlement, and thus she was
allowed to use the annuity taxation rules of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 72; Alfred
J. Miville, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 856 (1970), where payments were held to be a
"property settlement" as to the wife, and thus were not income in respect of a decedent
when received by the taxpayer daughter after the wife's death; Jacob Gasman, 26
CCH Tax CL Mem. 213 (1967), where because the husband's payment was for re-
lease of the wife's joint property claim, he was allowed to add it to the basis of his
property.
45. E.g., Bardwell v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 786, 789 (10th Cir. 1963). See
Scofield v. Greer, 185 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1950); Brantley L. Watkins, 53 T.C. No. 34
(Dec. 1, 1969). Nor will the absence of the "alimony" label dictate a "property set-
tlement" finding. Sadie M. Schroeder, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1266, 1270 (1960).
On the other hand, the labels given by the parties have been mentioned in at
least three cases as a factor supporting the court's result. Soltermann v. United
States, 272 F.2d 387, 390 (9th Cir. 1959) (alimony); Hazel Porter, 25 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 448, 449 (1966) (alimony); John S. Thompson, 22 T.C. 275, 281 (1954),
acquiesced in, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 6 (community property settlement).
46. E.g., Lewis B. Jackson, Jr., 54 T.C. No. 11, at 2284 (Feb. 2, 1970); Wilma
Thompson, 50 T.C. 522, 525 (1968); William Wells-Lee, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1217,
1220 (1966). But see United States v. Rosenfield, CCH 1964 STAND. FED. TAX REP.,
U.S. TAX CAs. (64-2, at 94,098) f 9809 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1964).
47. Riddell v. Guggenheim, 281 F.2d 836, 841 (9th Cir. 1960). This use of
state law has been severely criticized in Note, Taxation of Alimony, 16 HASTINGS L.J.
608, 618-19 (1965). It is argued that where the Code has intended that state laws be
used in determining property rights, it has said so explicitly and that no such authority
appears in section 71. The note's author finds it impossible to reconcile the judicial
admssion of varying state property laws with the express disavowal of varying state
Moving a step further, should the courts look to the wife's right to
alimony under state law in order to characterize a given set of pay-
ments? They should not. Indeed, freedom from varying state laws
on support rights and a consequent uniformity of treatment for federal
tax purposes was one of the express reasons for the 1942 enactment
of the alimony provisions.48 Thus, the fact that there is no legal obli-
gation to pay alimony in Texas 9 will not be considered when charac-
terizing a set of Texas payments for tax purposes.50 Furthermore, even
a prior characterization by a high state court of the same set of pay-
ments will be disregarded. 5
But in determining the application of the "contingencies rule,
' 52
state law reenters the picture: The regulations will impose contingen-
cies on an agreement if they would be imposed by state law.53 For
example, the Internal Revenue Service ruled that since Washington
State statutes provide for modification of alimony on a change of eco-
nomic circumstances, and its termination on the death of either spouse,
a Washington decree imposing a straight set of payments for 4 years
was implicitly subject to contingencies and thus was "periodic." 4  This
support laws in the committee reports. See note 48 infra. This is a novel though quite
plausible argument, and it may add even more force to the proposal for a mechanical
"support v. property settlement" standard made by the Tax Section of the American
Bar Association. See note 42 supra & text accompanying notes 185-96 infra.
48. Taylor v. Campbell, 335 F.2d 841, 845 (5th Cir. 1964), quoting, S. REP.
No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1942).
49. The leading case on the murky subject of the legal obligation to make sup-
port payments in Texas is Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29 (Sup. Ct. 1967). It is
emphasized there that support payments that are judicially granted upon a decree of
absolute divorce are "alimony," and as such seriously contravene Texas public policy.
Surprisingly, the court held that public policy would not be offended by a contractual
obligation for payments agreed upon by the parties themselves and merely "approved"
by the court in its decree.
50. See, e.g., Taylor v. Campbell, 335 F.2d 841, 845 (5th Cir. 1964); Thomas
E. Hogg, 13 T.C. 361, 367 (1949). The first authority for th's proposition was
Tuckie G. Hesse, 7 T.C. 700 (1946), holding Pennsylvania law similarly irrelevant for
tax purposes. However, it is necessary to report at least one clear violation of this
principle. In Lewis B. Jackson, Jr., 54 T.C. No. 11 (Feb. 2, 1970), the Tax Court
found a "property settlement," buttressing its position by a detailed inquiry into Okla-
homa law. It found that the wife would not have been entitled to alimony payments
under state law since she was the guilty party in the divorce.
51. The leading case on this point is Soltermann v. United States, 272 F.2d 387
(9th Cir. 1959). The Supreme Court of Florida, in denying the husband's pet'tion for
modification of the original divorce decree, held that the payments were part of a
"property settlement" and not for "support." This holding was deemed irrelevant in
the tax case. Id. at 389. See cases cited note 46 supra.
52. See text accompanying notes 11 & 12 supra.
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3)(ii)(a) (1957).
54. Rev. Rul. 190, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 23. Cf. Brown v. Commissioner, 415
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is certainly ironic in view of the avowed purpose of the 1942 provi-
sions.55
Testimony concerning the preagreement negotiations of the par-
ties is admissible, apparently under the general principle that parol
evidence will be admitted if the agreement is ambiguous.56 For ex-
ample, assertions that the husband had always spoken in terms of a
lump-sum settlement,57 or that the wife's support had never been dis-
cussed,58 have been admitted as evidence of the "property settlement"
nature of the payments. Similarly, assertions that preagreement ne-
gotiations were influenced by how much the husband would pay per
month,5 9 or that a 15-year payout term of an obligation was chosen
because it would take the wife to the age for social security eligi-
bility6" have been admitted as evidence of the "support" nature of the
payments.
The weight to be attributed to such evidence is, of course, a matter
for the trial court, subject to reversal on review if there is so little
evidence that the court's decision can be found to be "clearly errone-
ous." 61 The most noteworthy application of this rule in a "support v.
property settlement" case is seen in the sequence of decisions beginning
with Alfons B. Landa.62 The obligation in issue was characterized in
the separation agreement, somewhat ambiguously, as an indebtedness of
the husband to the wife, to be paid in monthly installments with in-
F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1969), affg 50 T.C. 865 (1968), which held that since Virginia
law automatically cut off support payments upon the wife's remarriage, payments
made by the former husband after her remarriage were for child support or were non-
deductible gifts, but in any event were no longer deductible alimony. The payments in
Brown had been imposed by the decree only, and had not been the subject of a prop-
erty settlement agreement between the parties. In Allen Hoffman, 54 T.C. No. 156
(Aug. 12, 1970), the Tax Court reached the same result where there was such an
agreement adopted in the decree, and Illinois law required the termination of alimony
upon remarriage.
55. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
56. In Riddell v. Guggenheim, 281 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1960), the agreement la-
beled the payments as a property settlement, but they were subject to termination
upon the occurrence of certain contingencies, indicating support; thus, parol evidence
admitted by the lower court was approved. Id. at 840. See also Scofield v. Greer,
185 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1950).
57. Bernatschke v. United States, 364 F.2d 400, 407 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
58. Scott v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 257, 260 (D. Ore. 1963); Lewis B.
Jackson, Jr., 54 T.C. No. 11 (Feb. 2, 1970).
59. Thomas E. Hogg, 13 T.C. 361, 366 (1949).
60. Hazel Porter, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 448, 450 (1966).
61. United States v. United States Gypsum, 333 U.S. 364, 396; Riddell v. Gug-
genheim, 281 F.2d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1960) (dictum).
62. 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 420 (1952).
terest, but subject to cancellation at the wife's death. The wife did not
testify, before the Tax Court but the husband testified that no indebted-
ness had ever existed and that the payments were intended for the wife's
support.6"
The Tax Court, disregarding the husband's testimony, held that
the payments were in discharge of an indebtedness and thus nonde-
ductible."4 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit felt the Tax Court had, in effect, errone-
ously excluded the husband's testimony; thus, it remanded the case
with directions to the Tax Court to "assess the probative weight" of
the husband's testimony.65 The Tax Court reconsidered his testimony,
found the written agreement to be of more weight, and again found the
payments to be in discharge of an indebtedness. 6
The circuit court again reversed, this time under the "clearly er-
roneous" rule. The court specifically pointed out evidence in favor of
a "support" holding-including the "uncontradicted" testimony of the
husband,6 7 and directed the Tax Court to enter judgment accordingly.
68
Thus, it seems clear that oral testimony may be of extremely great
weight.
B. Problems Peculiar to Community Property States
Approximately half of the cases specifically dealing with the
"support v. property settlement" issue have arisen in the eight com-
munity property states. The reason is simple: In a community prop-
erty state the wife usually has acquired substantial property rights, and
she is therefore more likely to take the position that a set of periodic
payments is made in discharge of such rights. In these states, the-
oretically, the hallmark of a good divorce settlement agreement would
be a division of property in accordance with the laws of the particular
state, followed by a separate provision for periodic support payments
(when applicable under state law). When such elements are set forth
separately in the agreement or decree, especially when the former is
payable in a lump sum or by transfer of specific properties, courts are
likely to find the former a "property settlement" payment and the latter
"support" payments.69
63. Id. at 423.
64. Id. at 423-24.
65. Landa v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 431, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
66. Alfons B. Landa, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 597, 598 (1953).
67. Landa v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 46, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
68. Id. at 50.
69. See, e.g., John F. Stone, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 845 (1964).
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However, there may be certain obstacles along the way. Let us
suppose that the parties have made in the agreement what purports to
be a partition of the community property, and have provided elsewhere
for periodic cash payments that the husband now seeks to deduct as
alimony. Will a court determine whether the parties partition of com-
munity property is correct and equitable before characterizing the pe-
riodic payments as "support," or will it automatically accept the parti-
tion without examination? The answer is that both approaches have
been taken. Some courts have apparently examined the partition and
found it satisfactory;"0 others, although they have included as part of
their "findings of fact" a statement that the wife had been awarded at
least half of the community property, 71 apparently did not actually un-
dertake a comparison of values. Conversely, the most permissive view
appears in Willet Parry72 and Thomas E. Hogg,73 where it is indicated
that the community property division is essentially a matter of negotia-
tion between the parties. In support of this approach of judicial non-
interference, one writer has observed that many unequal divisions of
community property are made on purpose-for example, to compen-
sate an injured spouse or to facilitate the negotiations.
74
Different considerations are involved when the agreement provides
for only one series of payments, accompanied by very little or no divi-
sion of tangible property. In Riddell v. Guggenheim75 the lower
court record was very vague as to what items of tangible property were
actually community property and as to how they were divided; thus,
the case was remanded to the lower court for findings on these points.
Only after such findings could it be determined whether the cash pay-
ments were for "support" or were payment for the wife's property
70. E.g., Floyd H. Brown, 16 T.C. 623 (1951), acquiesced in, 1951-2 Cum.
BuLL. 2. The court also indicates that the division of community property need not
be equal in certain situations. Id. at 631. See note 74 infra.
71. E.g., Blanche C. Newbury, 46 T.C. 690 (1966), acquiesced in, 1970 INT.
RaV. BuLL. No. 30, at 6.
72. 24 CCH Tax CL Mem. 1772, 1775 (1965). In this case, the wife was pre-
cluded from later attacking the equality of the community property division because
the spouses had agreed in the separation agreement to a "division of the community
property without placing any value thereon." Id. at 1773.
73. 13 T.C. 361, 367 (1949). In this case the court observed that while there
had been no calculation of the community property to which the wife might be en-
titled, this was not and need not have been a factor in the settlement terms. Id. at 367.
74. Bell, Tax Planning in Divorce Cases-With Emphasis on Community Prop-
erty States, 1 FAMILY L.Q. 41, 47 (June 1967). The author proposes the possibility
of taxable gain arising from an unequal division of community property, but the argu-
ment seems to apply as well to the "support v. property settlement" situation.
75. 281 F.2d 836, 842 (9th Cir. 1960).
rights. 76  This seems to be a correct resolution in such a situation, 7
although in common law states a different rule may apply for a single
set of small payments.
78
Three California cases 79 dealt with a problem arising from state
laws80 subjecting alimony provisions in the divorce court decree to sub-
sequent modification by the same divorce court."' In order to avoid
the uncertainties generated by the possibility of later modification, the
parties allegedly agreed to integrate both "support" and "property set-
tlement" provisions within the provision labeled "property settlement."
In each case it was argued that for tax purposes the true nature of the
payments, rather than their labels, should be recognized. Although
this argument was accepted in Jones"2 and Ryker, 3 it was rejected in
Guggenheim,84 probably because of the conflicting testimony and vague
evidence regarding the division of community property.
85
A similar argument has been made in Texas where the husband
claimed that provisions for "support" had been integrated within the
"property settlement. '8 6  It was argued that to use an "alimony" or
"support" label might have caused the agreement to be struck down as
against public policy. The court, however, was content to follow the
parties' agreement; thus, an "alimony" deduction was denied the hus-
band. This result should be expected to continue in light of the present
willingness of the Texas divorce courts to approve payments specified
76. On remand, the lower court found substantial community property and held
the periodic payments to be for property. Guggenheim v. Riddell, CCH 1963 STAND.
FED. TAX REP. U.S. TAX CAS. (63-1, at 87,236) ff 9148 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 1962).
77. In Harry Halprin, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1353 (1969), however, the
agreement contained virtually every possible factor indicating that the periodic cash
payments were for a "property settlement;" thus, it was easy for the Tax Court to so
hold without investigating the extent of the community property.
78. See note 90 infra.
79. Riddell v. Guggenheim, 281 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1960); Clyda T. Jones, 20
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1385 (1961); Ann H. Ryker, 33 T.C. 924 (1960).
80. For a general view of California law regarding modification at the time
these cases were decided, see 3 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Husband
and Wife §§ 135-42 (1960); for a general view of current California law, see id. §§
135-42A (1960, Supp. 1969).
81. It should be noted that modifiability by the court may in fact be a contin-
gency which will make less-than-10-year payments "periodic." See Robert P. Luh-
man, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 376 (1970), where such an argument went uncontested
by the Commissioner.
82. 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1385, 1389 (1961).
83. 33 T.C. 924, 929 (1960).
84. 281 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1960).
85. See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
86. Campbell v. Lake, 220 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1955).
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as "alimony" so long as they have been previously agreed upon by the
parties.
87
C. Separability of Payments in Common Law States
Often an agreement or decree either provides for more than one
set of payments, or in some way indicates that both property and sup-
port rights are being discharged in a single scheme of payments. Thus
it is sometimes necessary to separate the "support" portion of the pay-
ments from the "property settlement" portion. The easiest case is the
one in which the agreement sets out different payment programs in
different paragraphs. 88 As we have seen, such an agreement will nor-
mally be accepted, even in community property states.8 9
Where an agreement apparently provides for only one set of pay-
ments, however, it is difficult to predict whether a court will attempt
to separate the payments into "support" and "property settlement" ele-
ments. First, it has been said that no such separation will be made
for a set of small payments terminable at the wife's death.90
Most of the decided cases on this point have featured a large
initial payment followed by a series of smaller ones qualifying as "pe-
riodic" either because of the "contingencies rule"91 or the "10-year
rule."92  These cases are often disposed of not by "support" or "prop-
erty settlement" characterization, but rather by a decision that the larger
payment is or is not "periodic."93  At least six cases, however, have
87. See note 49 supra.
88. See, e.g., Knowles v. United States, 182 F. Supp. 150 (S.D. Miss. 1960);
Edward Bartsch, 18 T.C. 65 (1952), aff'd mem., 203 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1953); William
M. Haag, 17 T.C. 55 (1951).
89. See text accompanying notes 70-74 supra.
90. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(6) Example 1 (1957), according to Professor Sander,
"indicatets) that . . . if the payments are modest in amount and are geared to the
wife's life, they will be treated in toto as for support, without any allocation of
any portion to property rights. In community property states, however, such segre-
gation may be more readily required [citing Riddell v. Guggenheim, 281 F.2d 836
(9th Cir. 1960)]." SANDER, supra note 14, at A-13 & A-14.
It seems that the author draws a fairly broad conclusion from this single example
in the regulations; if this example is to be heavily relied upon, it seems advisable to
direct one's attention to the qualifying factors of modesty in amount and the wife's life
expectancy. For a separation into "support" and "property settlement" elements of an
arguably single set of payments that were geared to the wife's remarriage, see Brantley,
L. Watkins, 53 T.C. No. 84 (Dec. 1, 1969).
91. See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra.
92. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
93. See, e.g., Tate v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Helen
Hilgemeier, 42 T.C. 496 (1964).
explicitly decided the "support v. property settlement" issue.94 Al-
though a clear line is impossible to establish, the test seems to be that
if the initial payment is extremely large compared to later ones, a
"property settlement" characterization is given the initial payment
whereas the later payments receive "support" treatment.95
There are also slight variations of this basic pattern. For example,
where a husband had agreed to a basic obligation of $400 per month
with additional amounts of $6,500, $2,000, $2,000 and $2,000 in
months 1, 13, 25 and 37 after the decree, he was denied "support"
deductions as to the larger payments.9" Another settlement called for
periodic payments totaling $58,000, but up to $25,000 of this amount
would be forfeited by the wife if she remarried; there the court split
each periodic payment and characterized the nonforfeitable percentage
of the obligation as a "property settlement" rather than as "support."9
D. Other Factors Common to Both Common Law
and Community Property States
(1) Payments Made Prior to Formal Agreement or Decree
In many cases the parties have been separated for a substantial
period of time before taking any active steps toward obtaining a divorce
and before making or entering into a written agreement concerning the
division of property or providing for support of the wife. It is common
in such cases for the husband to make regular payments to the wife
for her living expenses during this time. If certain payments specified
in a later agreement or decree are comparable to the earlier payments,
tax courts have normally accepted this as a factor in favor of charac-
terizing the later payments as "support.""8
94. Charles S. Presbrey, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 379 (1970) (property settle-
ment); Brantley L. Watkins, 53 T.C. No. 34 (Dec. 1, 1969) (57% property settle-
ment, 43% support); Mary Schwab, 52 T.C. No. 84 (Aug. 14, 1969) (property set-
tlement); Wilma Thompson, 50 T.C. 522 (1968) (support); William F. Hagenloch,
26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 722 (1967) (property settlement as an alternative ground);
William Wells-Lee, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1217 (1966) (property settlement).
95. Compare William Wells-Lee, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1217 (1966) ($13,600
payment in first year, followed by $200 per month in succeeding years, with con-
tingencies) and Mary Schwab, 52 T.C. No. 84 (Aug. 14, 1969) ($206,000 immediately,
followed by $25,000 per year for 12 years), where separations were made, with
Wilma Thompson, 50 T.C. 522 (1968) ($8,000 in the first year, $3,000 yearly for 10
years), where it was held that there was a single scheme of periodic payments.
96. William F. Hagenloch, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 722 (1967). Separation
was further justified by evidence of the negotiations which clearly suggested a "prop-
erty settlement" element. Id. at 725. See text accompanying notes 56-60 supra.
97. Brantley L. Watkins, 53 T.C. No. 34 (Dec. 1, 1969).
98. E.g., Landa v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ($300 per
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(2) Similarity of Pre-Divorce Rights To Post-Divorce Payments
Another phenomenon of the "negotiations period" has appeared
as a factor in a few cases. As we know, a "separation agreement" is
often entered into before any legal steps are taken toward obtaining a
divorce, and such an agreement normally provides that it may be in-
corporated into a subsequent divorce decree verbatim. It would seem
natural for the parties to think of their rights and obligations of support
in terms of the conditions existing at that time-while they are still
married-rather than when eventually divorced. Certainly, if the wife
is unwilling to seek a divorce, or if she has a defense, the price of her
cooperation in making the agreement may be much higher than the
level of the payments (if any) she could obtain in a divorce court.
Despite this potential difference between "separation agreement" pay-
ments and reasonable post-divorce "support" payments, four Tax Court
cases have held such "separation agreement" payments to be entirely
for "support" when they were incorporated into the decree. 9 The Tax
Court reasoned that since the wife had a legal right to support when
the agreement was made she would not have given it up without de-
manding a similar contractual right in the agreement. 100
(3) Payments for Wife's Interest in Family Business
There have been several cases in which the wife argued that the
disputed payments were not taxable to her since they were not received
for her support, but were received for a release of an interest she had
acquired in the family business. In Jerome A. Blate,01- it was con-
ceded that the wife had acquired an interest in the business, and at
least part of the agreement had specifically referred to the business and
to some "purchase" of her interest. In holding that the disputed pay-
month during separation, $350 per month after "Note Agreement"); Hazel Porter,
25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 448 (1966) ($100 per week during separation, $100 per week
by decree); Jerome A. Blate, 34 T.C. 121 (1960), acquiesced in, 1961-2 CuM. BULL.
4 ($100 per week by oral agreement, $400 per month by written agreement). Contra,
Lewis B. Jackson, Jr., 54 T.C. No. 11 (Feb. 2, 1970) (predecree payments disregarded
since wife is guilty party relieving taxpayer from obligation to support under state
law); Harry Halprin, 28 CCH Tax CL Mem. 1353 (1969) (predecree payments were
alimony pendente lite and the "property settlement" factors were overwhelming).
99. Julia Nathan, 19 T.C. 865 (1953); Arletta C. Harris, 11 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 895 (1952); Floyd H. Brown, 16 T.C. 623 (1951), acquiesced in, 1951-2 CuM.
BuLL. 2; Thomas E. Hogg, 13 T.C. 361 (1949).
100. Cf. Jacob Gasman, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 213, 215 (1967), where the wife
had held a tenancy by the entirety, the court used similar language in reaching its
"property settlement" result.
101. 34 T.C. 121 (1960), acquiesced in, 1961-2 CuM. BuLL. 4.
ments related only to "support," the court relied heavily on evidence
that during the negotiations the parties felt it was desirable to vest the
entire control of the business in the husband; further, the parties had
never compared the value of the business interest and other property
given up by the wife with the estimated value of the payments to her
for life.' °2
A similar refusal to inquire into the negotiated settlement of the
business interests occurred in one case arising in a community property
state.'0 3 The company balance sheet showed quite clearly that the
wife's interest in the business was worth more than the "property" she
received under the agreement. The court emphasized, however, that
the husband had also agreed to discharge the corporate debts on which,
because of his endorsement, the community was secondarily liable.
This, reasoned the court, must have been adequate to equalize the
"property division" in the agreement. 10 4
On the other hand, in McCombs v. Commissioner,105 the wife
owned only 5 percent of the stock in the family business. Neverthe-
less, the divorce court awarded her 50 percent of the $180,000 value
of the business because of her substantial contributions to its success
over the years. Further, the divorce court stated that, in view of the
amount of property awarded to the wife, there would be no award of
"alimony."' 1 6 The court, like the Tax Court below, was disposed to
follow the "property settlement" determination of the divorce court;
thus, it refused to characterize any portion of the disputed payments
on a noncontingent $67,000 note as "support.' 1 0 7 Similarly, in Charles
S. Presbrey'0 8 a set of periodic payments totaling $35,000 was ruled
a "property settlement" rather than "support" where the wife had
contributed a building to the failing family business and her husband
had mortgaged it for approximately that amount.
We must note, however, one Texas case, Mauk v. Phinney,'0 9 in
which the Tax Court paid little heed to the apparent agreement of the
parties or to the decree of the divorce court. Here, the husband was
102. Id. at 128-29.
103. Floyd H. Brown, 16 T.C. 623 (1951) (La.).
104. Id. at 631.
105. 397 F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1968), aff'g. 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 563 (1967).
106. Id. at 7.
107. Id. at 8. The court's opinion does not describe the recitals of consideration
in the note. However, the divorce court did label the entire $90,000 award as a share
of property. Id. at 6 n.3.
108. 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 379, 382 (1970).
109. 280 F. Supp. 167 (S.D. Tex. 1967), rev'd, 411 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1969).
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allowed to deduct payments as "support" where his obligation was
based upon a promissory note for noncontingent payments of $70
per week for 20 years. According to the property settlement agree-
ment, the note was given as consideration for the wife's release of her
community property interest in the family corporation. The district
court, however, in determining that the weekly payments were for
"support," simply pointed to the insolvent condition of the business and
to the lack of evidence that a liquidation would yield an amount any-
thing like the $72,800 principal of the note. 110
Where no business interest had ever been formally recognized by
the parties or the divorce court, the tax courts have been generally
unreceptive to a wife's contention that payments were for her share in
the business. In Julia Nathan"' the wife argued that the husband had
always promised to give her a share in his business in recognition of
her services in its early, struggling days, and that the disputed payments
were in consideration for her release of this claim. No such business
interest was mentioned in the separation agreement. The Tax Court,
holding the payments includable in the wife's income as "support,"
merely observed that "[a]n unfulfilled promise of 10 years duration,
with no steps taken to enforce it, would seem to be of questionable
validity.""' 2 Similarly, in Wilma Thompson," 3 the wife argued that a
$38,000 award by the divorce court was to compensate her for land
that she and her husband originally owned as tenants by the entirety
but that had been transferred to a family corporation. The Tax Court
promptly rejected this contention, noting that the matter had neither
been raised nor settled at the divorce court level. Thus, the normal
judicial treatment of these "business interest" arguments seems correct:
Such matters are presumed settled in the negotiations or in the divorce
court, as courts hearing the tax cases are poorly equipped to deal with
them de novo.
110. 280 F. Supp. at 169. The final outcome of this case is uncertain. It has
been reversed and remanded, 411 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1969), because there had
been no evidence as to the intent of the parties to the agreement which the appellate
court regarded as essential in determining the "support v. property settlement" ques-
tion. Other aspects of this case are discussed in the text accompanying notes 147-54
infra.
111. 19 T.C. 865 (1953).
112. Id. at 871. See also Thomas E. Hogg, 13 T.C. 361 (1949), where the wife's
claim that the husband's immense oil holdings were community property had been dis-
puted by the husband throughout the negotiations.
113. 50 T.C. 522, 526 (1968).
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(4) Rental, Mortgage, and Utility Payments
There is also a small line of cases involving provisions in the
divorce settlement for housing for the wife and children. These provi-
sions have taken the form of an obligation of the husband to make
mortgage payments on the family residence after conveying it to the
wife, to purchase for the wife a house of her choice, or to pay rent.
One settlement required the husband to complete the few remaining
mortgage payments on the family home and to convey it to the wife;
because this noncontingent obligation would take less than 2 years
to complete, the payments were held to be in the nature of a "property
settlement."114
Another settlement' 15 required the husband to provide the wife,
within 10 years, with a house of her choice costing not more than
$40,000. When a house was decided upon, the husband financed it
by means of a more-than-10-year mortgage. His payments on this
mortgage, as well as the down payment, were held nondeductible. The
court reasoned that the basic obligation was to make a "property"
transfer-the house-and that taxability was not affected by the hus-
band's choice to split the payment into conveniently small amounts.
The settlement in Lounsbury v. Commissioner11 required the hus-
band to pay rent on the wife's existing residence until he, within 5 years,
provided her with a home costing not more than $10,000. Here again,
the house decided upon was financed by a down payment and a mort-
gage. The husband argued that the rent payments and the house pay-
ments constituted a single obligation to support the wife by providing
her a home, and that the final $10,000 obligation was but a "balloon
payment. 1 17 The husband was permitted a deduction for the rent
payments, but not for the mortgage payments; the court reasoned that
the rent payments provided "a reasonable time within which to arrange
for the basic capital transfer."""
A recent case required the wife to include in her income those
payments made by the husband for her rent and utility bills.1 9 The
114. Klemm v. United States, CCH 1957 STAND. FED. TAX. REP., U.S. TAX CAS.
(57-2, at 58,231) 9906 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 20, 1957). Similarly, in Robert P. Luh-
man, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 376 (1970), the court characterized as a "property
settlement" the husband's obligation to extinguish the loan on the automobile
awarded to the wife.
115. Van Orman v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1969).
116. 321 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1963).
117. Id. at 926.
118. Id. at 927 (emphasis added).
119. Doris B. Marinello, 54 T.C. No. 51 (Mar. 24, 1970).
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court, characterizing the payments as payments for "support," was evi-
dently influenced by the lack of an obligation to transfer or provide any
specific house or premises for the wife.
(5) Form of the Agreement
In still another line of "support v. property settlement" cases,
courts have emphasized the actual form of the agreement. As we have
seen,'120 the fact that one paragraph or section of the agreement sets
out periodic payments while another paragraph specifies a lump-sum
payment or a transfer of certain property, is likely to persuade a court
to accept the former payments as being for "support" and the latter as
a "property settlement." For example, in Blanche C. Newbury,12 the
Tax Court emphasized the elaborate nature of the agreement and the
care with which different sets of payments had been separated.
122
Likewise, several opinions, in holding a disputed set of payments to be
for a "property settlement," have emphasized that "support" payments
were provided for elsewhere.'
23
(6) Payments Subject to Contingencies
We now turn to the factor in the cases which occurs most fre-
quently and which, according to many authorities, holds the most excit-
ing possibilities for the attorney in controlling the tax consequences of
a divorce settlement: the presence or absence of contingencies modify-
ing the obligation to make payments.' 24  Contingencies play an im-
portant role in determining not only the "periodicity" of payments,
25
120. See text accompanying notes 69, 88-89 supra.
121. 46 T.C. 690 (1966).
122. See Harry Halprin, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1353 (1969), for a fine example
of drafting to achieve "property settlement" treatment for a single set of payments.
123. E.g., Van Orman v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1969); Le Roy
Keebler, 28 CCH Tax CL Mem. 1042 (1968); Joseph S. Freeland, 19 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1460, 1464 (1960). Conversely, in Marcella C. Salapatas, 28 CCH Tax CL
Mem. 1205, 1207 (1969) and John F. Stone, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 845, 846 (1964),
the tax court found the payments in issue to be for "support," emphasizing that the
property had been divided elsewhere.
124. The most simplistic view is found in Mills, Tax Checklist for Negotiating
Divorce and Separation Agreements, 22 J. TAx. 368 (1965), where the author goes
so far as to state flatly that if payments are made "periodic" by the "contingencies
rule" and if the agreement or decree specifies that all payments are for "support," the
husband will have no problem deducting them regardless of their true nature. Id.
at 369-70. This is simply not true. We have already seen that courts will not be bound
by labels in the decree. See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra. We shall see that
the mere presence of contingencies will not in itself assure "support" treatment.
125. It should be recalled that the "10-year rule" and the "contingencies rule"
but also in determining whether the payments in dispute can be char-
acterized as "support" payments.
Many cases deciding that the payments in question were for "sup-
port" have specifically mentioned the existence of a contingency (or
contingencies) as a factor supporting their conclusions.126 A few opin-
ions have failed to mention them. 12 ' Generally, the absence of some
of the possible contingencies will not be taken as a factor weighing
against a "support" characterization; 128 however, at least five cases
have mentioned the absence of the remarriage contingency as a factor
negativing the "support" inference.' 29  It would be expected that a
are alternative methods of determining whether a given set of payments are "pe-
riodic." See text accompanying notes 10-12 supra. Each rule, however, is supported
by an entirely different rationale for taxing the wife and giving the husband a deduc-
tion. The "10-year rule" is almost certainly based on the view that payments extend-
ing over such a long period of time come out of the husband's income and thus he
should be relieved of tax on them. By contrast, the length of the payment term is
not an inquiry in the application of the "contingencies rule." In fact, the occurrence
of a contingency may make the payment term extremely short, perhaps never causing an
"income" drain on the husband. The rationale behind the "contingency rule" is,
rather, that the existence of contingencies makes what might otherwise be an install-
ment obligation impossible to commute into a fixed sum. Baker v. Commissioner,
205 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1953). Unfortunately, however, this uncertain sum rationale
has no relation to what was apparently the original purpose underlying the 1942
amendments. See text accompanying notes 40-41, 48 supra.
Illustrating a slightly different approach, in William D. Price, Jr., 49 T.C. 676
(1968), the court expressly rejected the uncertainty of time theory. The taxpayer's
divorce decree provided for a reduction in monthly alimony payments upon a change in
child custody. The total amount to be paid, however, was a sum certain; thus, a
custody change would merely extend the time for payment. This, the court held, was
not a contingency which would allow the husband a deduction. Id. at 682-83. The
court did intimate that had it been shown that a new payment term "may" extend over
10 years, the taxpayer could have used the "10-year rule" for deductibility. Id. at 683.
126. E.g., Blanche C. Newbury, 46 T.C. 690, 695 (1966); Ann H. Ryker, 33
T.C. 924, 930 (1960); cases cited note 128 infra.
127. E.g., Doris B. Marinello, 54 T.C. No. 51 (Mar. 24, 1970); Sadie Schroeder,
19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1266 (1960).
128. See Brantley L. Watkins, 53 T.C. No. 34 (Dec. 1, 1969) (wife's remarriage
the only contingency); John F. Stone, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 845 (1964) (change in
econom;c status the only contingency); Estate of Frances B. Willson, 16 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 375 (1957) (change in economic status the only contingency); Arletta C.
Harris, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 895 (1952) (wife's death the only contingency);
Thomas E. Hogg, 13 T.C. 361 (1949) (absence of cut-off at wife's remarriage irrele-
vant).
129. McCombs v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 4, 7 (10th Cir. 1968); Soltermann v.
United States, 272 F.2d 387, 390 (9th Cir. 1959); Bernatschke v. United States, 364
F.2d 400, 408 (Ct. CI. 1966); Charles S. Presbrey, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 379, 382
(1970); Harry Halprin, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1353, 1356 (1969). The absence of
the contingency of the wife's death was also mentioned in McCombs v. Commis-
sioner, supra at 7, and in Harry Halprin, supra at 1356.
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court relying on the presence of contingencies in one set of payments
would discuss the importance of their presence with regard to every
other set of contingent payments in the agreement, but there is at least
one case in which this was clearly not done. 130
There is no doubt that the presence or absence of contingencies
has been an important factor in the large majority of the cases. In
fact, until 1966 no case had ever ruled in favor of "support" where
the payments were not contingent under the agreement, decree or ap-
plicable state law. 3' Since then there have been two Tax Court cases,
Hazel Porter'3  and Wilma Thompson, 3 and two district court cases,
Mauk v. Phinney134 and McGee v. United States,135 which have given
"support" characterization to noncontingent payments of more than
10 years duration. These cases are so unusual that they demand fur-
ther discussion.
Perhaps the easiest to understand is Hazel Porter, where the dis-
puted payments for a lump-sum "alimony" award were to be made
over a 15-year period. Virtually every factor suggesting "support"-
except contingencies-was present: First, the post-divorce payments
were very comparable to a pre-divorce "allowance" which the husband
paid; second, there was no opportunity for the wife to claim that the
payments represented her share of community property since the case
arose in a common law state, Ohio; and third, the wife's argument
that the payments represented her share in the family business was
130. Smith's Estate v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 349 (3rd Cir. 1953), where there
were two sets of payments specified in the agreement: a $25,000 lump sum payable
in ten semiannual installments, and a program of monthly payments starting at $300
per month and later dropping to $100. In a later paragraph of the agreement, all
of the payments were made contingent. The court relied on the contingencies in
finding the monthly payments to be for "support," but disregarded them in holding the
semi-annual payments to be for a "property settlement."
131. Scattered cases have held payments taxable to the wife despite the absence
of contingencies, but the issue had been framed in terms of "periodic v. installment"
payments rather than "support v. property settlement." Such results may reflect inade-
quate argument by counsel, as "support v. property settlement" is the critical issue
determining taxability once the payments are found to be "periodic." See, e.g., Helen
L. Hilgemeier, 42 T.C. 496 (1964). An analagous situation exists from the point of
view of the husband who is seeking to establish the deductibility of the payments.
See note 13 supra.
132. 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 448 (1966).
133. 50 T.C. 522 (1968).
134. 280 F. Supp. 167 (S.D. 1967), rev'd 411 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1969).
See note 110 & text accompanying notes 109-10 supra where another aspect of this case
is discussed.
135. 297 F. Supp. 797 (D. Wyo. 1968).
as weak as the one in Julia Nathan.136 Also, testimony concerning
the negotiations disclosed that the 15-year payout term was intended
"to carry her over to the social security time, more or less, 137 and
that a termination of payments upon remarriage was expressly avoided
so as to make the wife's remarriage a bit easier. 3 s In view of these
factors, it is fairly easy to understand the willingness of the court to give
"support" characterization despite the absence of contingencies.
"Support" characterization in Wilma Thompson'39 is somewhat
more difficult to understand. Several strong indicia of a "property
settlement"-in addition to the absence of contingencies-were present
and were pointed out to the court: The divorce court had awarded the
wife a fixed sum, payable in annual installments, bearing interest, and
secured by a mortgage on the husband's property. Also the wife's
"business interest" argument 14 had more merit than the argument in
Hazel Porter, and-unlike Hazel Porter-there was no evidence of a
preagreement allowance to bolster a "support" argument. Neverthe-
less, the court crippled the wife's "property settlement" argument by
placing the burden of proof upon her and by relying heavily upon its
interpretation of Indiana state law. The court observed that the wife
"failed to prove that the payment was not 'alimony.' "14 It also noted
that there was no evidence to substantiate her argument that the pay-
ments were for her interest in the family business rather than for "sup-
port."' 42  Additional authority was found by examining Indiana law
and concluding that the state's public policy favored an alimony award
of a fixed sum, rather than an indefinite set of payments-the theory
being that a fixed sum contributes to the finality of the separation ar-
rangements. 
4 3
The most recent addition to the group of cases in which "support"
characterization has been given despite the absence of contingencies is
McGee v. United States, 44 a Wyoming case. The divorce court had
awarded to the wife the family home and noncontingent payments
136. 19 T.C. 865 (1953). See text accompanying notes 111-12 supra.
137. 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 450.
138. Id.
139. 50 T.C. 522 (1968).
140. For discussion of the Wilma Thompson business argument, see text accom-
panying note 113 supra.
141. 50 T.C. at 525.
142. Id. Quaere: If the ex-husband had been the petitioner seeking a deduction,
would he have been required to rebut a "property settlement" presumption?
143. Id. at 527. Unfortunately, state law crept into the tax picture again at this
point. See text accompanying notes 48-55 supra & 195-96 infra.
144. 291 F. Supp. 797 (D. Wyo. 1968).
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of $75 per month for 10 years, labeling them "a property settlement
...in lieu of alimony. ' 145 The wife then failed to include the cash
payments as income in her tax return. The district court stated that
since the divorce court had clearly made no attempt to divide the prop-
erty of the marriage equally, and since the family home awarded to the
wife represented virtually all of the "marital estate," the cash payments
must represent "support" rather than a part of the "property settle-
ment.,146
The most remarkable of the four cases is Mauk v. Phinney.47
When it arose in Texas, there was probably a larger body of "support
v. property settlement" cases from Texas than from any other state.
These cases had been both unanimous and adamant in requiring con-
tingencies before giving "support" treatment.1
48
In Mauk v. Phinney the disputed payments to the wife were evi-
denced by a note and bill of sale reciting as consideration the wife's
interest in the family corporation. Nevertheless, the court characterized
the payments as "support," noting that the community property was
shown to have been divided very much in the wife's favor, 49 even
before taking into account the estimated value' 50 of the insolvent cor-
poration. The absence of contingencies was urged as evidence of a
"property settlement" by the Commissioner,' 5 ' but was ignored by the
court.
In holding the disputed payments to be for "support," the court
found the case to be "within the salutary rule of Taylor v. Campbell."'
1 52
After discussing the Taylor v. Campbell5" decision at length, the court
seemed to conclude that it had rejected all state divorce laws in tax
cases, in the interest of uniformity among the states in the application
of section 71. Even the most cursory reading of Taylor v. Campbell,
however, shows that it had rejected only state support laws, not prop-
erty laws. It is the opinion of this author that the Mauk court's exten-
sion of this principle of disregard of state law to the area of property
145. Id. at 799.
146. Id.
147. 280 F. Supp. 167 (S.D. Tex. 1967), rev'd 411 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1969).
148. See William D. Price, Jr., 49 T.C. 676, 680 (1968), which reviews the Texas
cases and concludes that if the agreement before the court had contained contingencies
it would have found "support."
149. 280 F. Supp. at 169.
150. See text accompanying note 110 supra.
151. 280 F. Supp. at 170.
152. Id. at 172.
153. 335 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1964). See note 48 & accompanying text supra.
rights was completely unwarranted, and was a clearly erroneous inter-
pretation of Taylor v. Campbell.
As noted,' the district court case was reversed and remanded on
the ground that a summary judgment allowing the deduction to the
husband had been improper. The Fifth Circuit's opinion, however,
did not directly attack the fallacies mentioned above. Thus, it seems
that there is still a substantial possibility that the same result will be
reached on remand.
Despite the infrequency of a "support" characterization where
there are no contingencies, it cannot be overemphasized that the mere
presence of contingencies is not a panacea to the parties who want to
be assured that their payments will receive "support" treatment. This
is but one factor, and the courts have shown ample willingness to disre-
gard the contingency and to find payments to be for "property settle-
ments" in appropriate cases. 155
E. Generalizations Drawn from the Cases
The foregoing discussion should make it clear that the cases have
not established any infallible guidelines for deciding the "support v.
property settlement" issue, but the following generalizations do seem
appropriate:
1. Courts will generally be unimpressed by labels attached
by the parties or by the divorce court,' 56 and they will not be bound
by the wife's right to support payments under state statutes.' 57
State law, however, will be persuasive insofar as it dictates certain
property rights for the wife, as in joint ownership or community
property situations;' 58 and it may return to impose contingencies on
a given set of payments.' 59
2. Oral evidence of negotiations will be considered'6 ° and
given fairly great weight.'
3. If an agreement or decree by its form establishes one
set of periodic payments along with other payments involving lump-
154. See note 110 supra.
155. E.g., John S. Thompson, 22 T.C. 275 (1954), acquiesced in, 1954-2 CuM.
BULL. 6; William Wells-Lee, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1217 (1966).
156. See notes 45-46 & accompanying text supra.
157. See notes 48-51 & accompanying text supra.
158. See note 47 & accompanying text supra.
159. See notes 52-55 & accompanying text supra.
160. See notes 56-60 & accompanying text supra.
161. See notes 61-68 & accompanying text supra.
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sum transfers, a court is likely to accept the distinction and hold
only the former taxable to the wife as "support" payments.' 62
4. Where there is only one set of payments fairly uniform
in size and which have strong "support" characteristics such as con-
tingencies, they will ordinarily be held to be for "support.' 163  In
community property states, however, the court may first insist upon
a determination of the wife's community property rights. 164 Where
the payments are not uniform in size, the larger payments may be
characterized as a "property settlement."'165
5. Where an agreement makes some division of property or
family business interests, that division will usually be accepted by
the court as a matter which was appropriate for negotiations.' 66 In
community property states, however, the division may be reexam-
ined.
167
6. Where the amount of the periodic payments under the
agreement or decree is comparable to the amount of any voluntary
payments made by the husband before an agreement was reached,
it is probable that such payments will be treated as "support" pay-
ments. 68
7. Contingencies upon the payments will strongly suggest
"support," 69 at least if this is not clearly rebutted by other factors. 17°
IV. The Future of the "Support" Requirement
A. Implications to the Practicing Attorney
A clear understanding of the "support v. property settlement"
problem is certainly indispensable to an attorney handling a divorce in
a community property state, since every settlement potentially contains
a property element, and in some states the presumption that commu-
nity property exists is very strong indeed.' 7 ' However, the common law
162. See notes 69, 88-89 & accompanying text supra.
163. See notes 124-30 & accompanying text supra.
164. See notes 75-77 & accompanying text supra.
165. See notes 94-97 & accompanying text supra.
166. See notes 70-74, 88-89, 101-07 & accompanying text supra.
167. See notes 75-78 & accompanying text supra.
168. See note 98 & accompanying text supra.
169. See notes 124-30 & accompanying text supra.
170. See note 155 & accompanying text supra.
171. See Note, Taxation of Alimony, 16 HAsTjNcS LJ. 608 (1965), for a review
of the various community property presumptions and the ways in which they may
affect results in tax cases.
attorney must remember that about half of the decided cases involved
divorces in common law states, and the ways in which the "prop-
erty settlement" argument has crept into the cases have been quite
varied. Of course the most frequent argument is that the wife owned
a "business interest" which is being settled through the disputed pay-
ments. Also, any type of concurrent ownership, even though the wife's
interest may be only a right of survivorship, may give rise to the "prop-
erty settlement" argument.
172
The cases which have been decided in this area all have one thing
in common: They arose from agreements which were poorly drafted
or from decrees which, having no agreement to adopt, were carelessly
phrased. The guidelines given in the previous section should suggest
several ways in which negotiations and planning could be more suc-
cessful.
First of all, it should be borne in mind by both parties and their
counsel that the negotiations for the settlement should not be an "ad-
versary" process in the strict sense of the term. Both parties will gain
if the tax impact is sensibly and predictably allocated. It is meaning-
less for the husband to insist that all payments be deductible and for
the wife to insist that they be nontaxable-just such confusion as we
have already seen will result.
Turning back to the actual language of the "support" require-
ment in the regulations, the relevant phrase is "in recognition of the
general obligation to support which is made specific by the decree, in-
strument, or agreement."'1 73  Therefore, the parties should specify in
the same paragraph which sets out the property division or the set
of payments whether they are meant to be for "support" or for a
"property settlement." The mere statement at the end of the agree-
ment that the provisions therein are in full satisfaction of the wife's
property and support claims is simply insufficient. It seems clear now
that the parties need not fear being candid about their intentions even
172. See, e.g., Bardwell v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1963) (joint
tenancy); Mills v. United States, CCH 1967 STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S. TAX CAS.
(67-2, at 84, 870) V 9101 (N.D. Okla. July 11, 1967) (joint tenancy); Scott v.
United States, 225 F. Supp. 257 (D. Ore. 1963) (tenancy by the entirety); Wilma
Thompson, 50 T.C. 522 (1968) (tenancy by the entirety). A separate action involving
the ex-husband in the Mills case was recently decided, Ernest H. Mills, 54 T.C. No. 55
(Mar. 25, 1970). Rather than recognize the Commissioner's argument that the same
issue had already been decided, the Tax Court chose to reconsider the merits. For-
tunately, the same decision was reached.
173. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-(b)(4) (1957) (emphasis added).
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in Texas, where "alimony" was once thought to be a very risky word.1
7 4
As we have seen, however, labels are not enough. Therefore,
payments intended to be taxable to the wife' 75 should probably extend
by their terms beyond 10 years, and by all means should be contingent.
While the most common contingency arrangement is the death of either
spouse or the remarriage of the wife, the remarriage clause may make
her less attractive on the "marriage market."'71 6  Too little attention, it
seems, has been given to a certain use of the "change in economic
status of either spouse" contingency.' 77  When substituted for the re-
marriage cutoff, it should make the wife a bit more attractive for re-
marriage while reducing or terminating the first husband's obligations
if the second husband is of suitable means.1
On the other hand, the parties may intend that some payments
be treated as a "property settlement." Therefore, they will want to
take certain steps to avoid any implications that they are "support"
payments deductible by the husband. The most important step is to
eliminate entirely their "periodicity" by making them noncontingent
and payable in less than 10 years. Also, a specific label as a property
settlement, a stated principal sum, and an interest factor should be
added.179  Unfortunately, however, after such an agreement is incorpo-
rated into a divorce decree, it will in many states become modifiable
and subject to contingencies by state law. Obviously this gives the
contingencies doctrine an extremely broad sweep,' 80 and there remains
174. See note 49 & accompanying text supra.
175. Where the parties so intend, there seems to be no reason why payments for
what is actually a "property settlement" cannot, by careful planning, be made taxable
to the wife. The wife must be willing to subject her right to receive payments to
contingencies, but her risk can be minimized by making the payments somewhat larger
in the early years of payment. Care must be taken, however, to specify that the
whole series of payments is a single obligation. Also, one must avoid making the early
payments so much larger that a court might attempt to separate them into "property
settlement" and "support" elements. SANDER, supra note 14, at A-15, discussing Wil-
liam F. Hagenloch, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 722 (1967).
176. Note that the husband in Hazel Porter, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 448, 450
(1966), testified that the remarriage contingency was avoided for precisely this reason.
See text accompanying note 138 supra.
177. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1(d)(3)(a) (1957).
178. John F. Stone, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 845 (1964), probably best exemplifies
the use of this type of contingency.
179. While it does not contain all of the factors suggested, the agreement in
Harry Halprin, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1353 (1969), seems to be the best example of
drafting to achieve a "property settlement" result.
180. See SANDER, supra note 14, at A-7 to A-10 for an excellent discussion of
this problem.
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very little, if any, correspondence between current results and the origi-
nal purpose of the alimony provisions.""1
Litigation on the "support v. property settlement" question has
frequently arisen because the parties took inconsistent positions on their
income tax returns with regard to the payments. This suggests a final
safeguard which would seem elementary but which has, in fact, been
used in only one of the decided cases: 18 2 to make it clear in the agree-
ment that the tax consequences have been considered and that they
are intended to fall in a certain way. In the event the taxes for some
reason do not fall as planned, the agreement should provide for rene-
gotiation. To guard against the possibility that a spouse might take a
different position from that agreed upon, a penalty provision should be
included.
B. Legislative Reform
It is indeed unfortunate that the case law dealing with the "sup-
port v. property settlement" issue leaves one so confused. It is even
worse that the practitioner, to be reasonably certain of results, must
resort to the whole battery of safeguards discussed in the preceding sec-
tion. Since the practice of judicial investigation into the "true" nature
of the rights discharged by the payments has not yielded consistent
results, it would seem highly desirable that the troublesome "support v.
property settlement" distinction be changed in one of two ways:
1. Since it has been so difficult to divine a persuasive reason
for the "support" requirement, it seems that it should be struck from
the regulations, leaving "periodicity" as the only test of taxability, or
2. The "support" requirement should be recognized in the
Code and subjected to a single, simple test for its fulfillment.
In the wake of the Tax Reform Act of 1969183 and its ambitious
attack on a vast variety of inequities, preferences, abuses and other
sins in the Internal Revenue Code, one wonders why, if the need for
reform in the "support v. property settlement" area is so pressing,
it was not considered in any of the Congressional hearings? This is
181. See text accompanying notes 40-41, 48 supra.
182. In Ann H. Ryker, 33 T.C. 924 (1960), provisions were made for support
payments amounting to 25% of the husband's income, but with the additional safeguard
that if the husband were for any reason not allowed to deduct them the 25% share
would be measured from his after-tax income. See also Taylor v. Campbell, 335
F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1954), where the separation agreement stated that all amounts
mentioned therein were net of any tax on the wife.
183. 83 Stat. 487.
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easily explained: The basic inequity in this area was corrected in
1942,184 and the problem now is one of confusion and unpredictability.
Generally, the Tax Reform Act did not attempt to cure this type of
problem-such matters were well below the goals of our lawmakers in
1969. Nevertheless, there has for some time been a need for im-
provement in the rules of section 71 to facilitate planning and nego-
tiations in divorce settlements. In 1966, the Section of Taxation of the
American Bar Association was so convinced of the need for clarification
that it made, 8 5 and subsequently approved, 186 a legislative proposal.
While no further action has been taken on it, the proposal bears dis-
cussion here.
Basically, the provision would affect paragraph (c) (2) of section
71187 which presently sets forth the "10-year rule."' It is proposed
that "10-year rule" payments be presumed to be for "support" unless
the decree, instrument, or agreement specifically states that they are for
purchase of the wife's property rights. The main argument given in
favor of the proposition is that the "10-year rule" serves no purpose
"unless it rules out inquiry into the character of the consideration the
wife gives up for the ["10-year rule"] payments."'
89
184. See note 1 supra.
185. Tax Section Annual Report, supra note 42, at 62-63. At the same time the
Tax Section proposed legislation which would overrule United States v. Davis, 370
U.S. 65 (1962). In fact, it was the fear that a broad reading of Davis would have
implications in the "support" area which made the Tax Section recognize the whole
"support v. property settlement" problem. Joint Technical Session Presented by Sec-
tion of Taxation and Section of Family Law at Montreal, Canada, BULL. ABA SECTION
OF TAxATTON, Oct. 1966, at 107, 126-32 [hereinafter cited as Montreal Panel
Discussion].
186. American Bar Association Action, BULL. ABA SECTION OF TAxATION, Apr.
1967, at 5, 6.
187. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 17(c) (2) provides: "WHERE PERIOD FOR PAYMENT
is MORE TiAN 10 YEAns.-If, by the terms of the decree, instrument, or agreement, the
principal sum referred to in paragraph (1) is to be paid or may be paid over a period
ending more than 10 years from the date of such decree, instrument, or agreement, then
(notwithstanding paragraph (1)) the installment payments shall be treated as periodic
payments for purposes of subsection (a), but (in the case of any one taxable year of the
wife) only to the extent of 10 percent of the principal sum. For purposes of the pre-
ceding sentence, the part of any principal sum which is allocable to a period after the
taxable year of the wife in which it is received shall be treated as an installment pay-
ment for the taxable year in which it is received.
188. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
189. Tex Section Annual Report, supra note 42, at 63. Note that this approach
is actually a blend of the two alternatives suggested above. While the payment time
is of paramount importance in the proposal, the "support v. property settlement"
distinction is retained. However, its application is clarified by a "support" pre-
sumption.
In the panel discussion at the August 1966 meeting in Mon-
treal 9 ' there was considerable talk about the uncertainty and confusion
surrounding the "support v. property settlement" issue under the "10-
year rule." A review of the cases, however, reveals that almost all of
the uncertainty and confusion is in the "contingency rule" area. As we
have seen, all except four of the cases' 9 ' have found a "property settle-
ment" where there were "10-year rule" payments with no contingencies;
but, when contingencies were added, the courts have split irreconcil-
ably between "support" and "property settlement" treatment.' 92
Thus, confusion is eliminated by the American Bar Association
proposal only when the payments' sole claim to "periodic" treatment
is the "10-year rule."19' As has been demonstrated, however,19 4 the
broad sweep of the "contingencies rule"-especially when the con-
tingencies are implied by state law' 95 -has frustrated the intent of
many more divorce settlements than has the "10-year rule." It is the
opinion of this author that the difficulty with the proposal lies not in
what it covers, but in what it fails to cover. There is little doubt that
the American Bar Association arrived at a sound conclusion in deciding
that Congress must have originally intended a "support" presumption
for "10-year rule" payments, 196 and it seems that by extending the
proposed presumption to the "contingencies rule" area-a very simple
revision to the Code-the "support v. property settlement" problem
would largely disappear from the tax scene.
It is interesting to note another reform proposal which has been
made by a few of the commentators: The "contingencies rule" should
be abrogated, 197 if for no other reason than that its application has
gotten out of hand.' 98 If this were added to the American Bar Asso-
ciation proposal, the result would be a single test for "periodicity"-
the "10-year rule." Under such a proposal one finds a continued, but
much less troublesome, application of the "support" requirement
through the presumption of "support," freedom from the vagaries of
state law in determining when payments are subject to contingencies,
and a return to the original purposes of the alimony provisions.
190. Montreal Panel Discussion, supra note 185, at 127, 129.
191. See text accompanying notes 132-54 supra.
192. See text accompanying notes 126-31 & 155 supra.
193. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
194. See note 54 supra.
195. See notes 52-55, 179-81 & accompanying text supra.
196. See note 125 & accompanying text supra.
197. See, e.g., SANDER, supra note 14, at A-9.
198. See text accompanying notes 180-81 supra.
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To conclude, the "support v. property settlement" issue is very alive
and important in today's divorce taxation practice, but there has been
such a diversity of facts and factors in the decided cases that they leave
the practitioner somewhat confused. Nevertheless, the results can be
controlled by sensible negotiations, or better still, by clarifying legisla-
tion.

